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in the first three months of employment and 73 percent have lost or quit their job within one year. 6 Among factors that affect turnover rates among welfare hires, studies have found that turnover is reduced among welfare hires receiving higher wages and those employed in higherskilled jobs (for example, see Berg et al. 1990 , Leete 1996 , and Lane and Stevens 1995 . In addition, one study (Berg et al. 1992) has found that job loss among welfare hires was more likely for absenteeism, tardiness, and poor social skills, and not for poor physical skills or personal reasons. None of the studies compares the turnover rates among welfare hires with comparable non-welfare hires. The analysis in this paper makes use of data which allows for comparisons of turnover to be made between fairly homogenous welfare and non-welfare hires.
The data also allow a comparison of the reason for job separation. A number of key factors have been identified in the broader turnover literature that have proven to be important determinants of separation behavior. This literature will help guide the structure of the empirical analysis that follows.
7
The results of the analyses indicate that the separation behavior of welfare hires is not remarkably different from non-welfare hires. Welfare hires are found to be less likely to separate, staying on the job for approximately one week longer than non-welfare hires (evaluated at the median tenure). Welfare hires are found to separate sooner for being fired for cause, and to separate later for personal or professional reasons. To improve the retention of both welfare and non-welfare hires, mentoring programs were found to be the most effective type of work program. 6 Others finding high turnover rates among former welfare recipients include Berg et al (1990) , Leete (1996) , Eberts (1997) , Stevens (1998), and Her et al (1995) . 7 Blau and Kahn (1981) , Berg et al. (1992) , Meitzen (1986) , Sicherman (1996) , Bartel (1982) , and Weiss (1984) all provide good sources of factors that have found to be important in the determination of quit behavior.
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II. Unique Data
The data used in this study are from the personnel records of a large, unionized firm in the transportation industry with numerous domestic and international locations. Since this firm mainly employs domestic workers and the welfare-to-work concept being studied applies only to the United States, the study is restricted to domestic workers. Due to the numerous different job types this firm employs, the focus will be on one particular type: part-time package sorters. This part-time position typically involves working four to five hours a day, five days a week. 8 By focusing on one job type, this study provides for homogeneity in working conditions. This type of work often involves heavy lifting, repetitiveness, and working conditions with extreme temperatures depending on the weather. Since this job requires a relatively low level of skill, this is a typical job that a welfare recipient would be able to obtain. As Wolman (1996, 2) reports, "AFDC recipients have below average education levels and cognitive skills," making them more likely to find jobs in the low-skill service sector and in light factory work.
9
The data set was constructed by querying the firm's personnel records for all employees (of this job type) hired from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1999. These employees were then matched with other personnel tables to obtain data on demographic characteristics, such as education and age, and job-related characteristics such as shift worked. The sample size is 80,834, of which 5,026 are welfare hires. 10 Summary statistics (of selected variables), by type of 8 For information on hours worked by welfare recipients, see Brauner and Loprest (1999) , Parrott (1998) and Loprest (2000) . 9 See Zill et al. (1991) also for types of jobs obtained by welfare recipients. 10 To be classified as a welfare hire, the individual must meet the welfare criteria applicable to the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC). Qualified AFDC recipients are any individuals who are members of a family receiving AFDC (or a successor program) for any nine months during -4 -hire and censoring status, are presented in Table 2 . 11 For a description of the variables, see Table   1 . The separation percentage is four percentage points higher for non-welfare hires (61% vs. 57%). A form of the dependent variable in the duration model, tenure, indicates that the average tenure is longer for welfare hires by a few days (116 vs. 114 days). (Note that 66% of welfare hires and 68% of non-welfare hires have tenure below the mean tenure reported for their welfare status category.) The average age of the welfare hires, 24, is one year younger than the average age of the non-welfare hires. The average education level is similar for the two groups, differing by less than one year. The average hourly pay rate is almost identical for the two groups, which is expected since the job is a union job and both groups have similar tenure. A larger percentage of the welfare hires are female and black.
[ Tables 1 and 2 hires. Looking at the fired for cause category, a larger percentage of welfare hires were included in this category compared to non-welfare hires, 18 percent versus 10 percent.
[ Table 3 here] 12 Employees who were dissatisfied with a particular job aspect were grouped with individuals who quit to take another job since it is believed that the latter group quit in hopes of obtaining a better job. Approximately 26% of non-welfare hires and 35% of welfare hires in the professional quit reason category were dissatisfied with an aspect of the job; the remaining 74% and 65%, respectively, quit to take a different job.
-6 -reasons (49 days), followed by professional reasons (45 days), and then fired for cause (38 days).
III. Theory of Quit Behavior
This section applies a standard search model framework in which to examine the decision of a worker to quit his/her present job. While the empirical section will model separations more generally, quitting is the predominant form of separation among these workers, and the theoretical model will identify how some key determinants of quit behavior can be expected to influence the individual level decision to separate from one's job.
The decision to stay at one's present job, return to welfare, or to obtain another job can be viewed as maximizing the net present value of one's expected utility over an infinite horizon.
Utility, U(.), is assumed to be a function of money received in the form of income from working (I) or in the form of a public assistance subsidy (S), and leisure. An individual is assumed to be currently working at job J 1 and receiving income I 1 and leisure equal to zero. 13 The decision facing the individual is whether to remain at her current job or to quit this job. If she quits her job, she faces a probability p of obtaining a better job (job J 2 with income I 2 where E(I 2 ) > E(I 1 )) and probability (1-p) of returning to welfare. The utility received from returning to welfare is dependent upon how long the individual has received welfare relative to the state-specific time limit for receiving welfare. If her time on welfare, t w , is less than the maximum welfare receipt time period in that state, she will receive the public assistance subsidy, S. However, if she has already exceeded the maximum time allowable on welfare, t max , she receives no subsidy. Leisure is assumed to equal one if the individual returns to welfare.
14 Thus, the expected utilities are:
13 Available time has been normalized to equal one. 14 For simplicity, the current analysis abstracts from the possibility of working while on welfare.
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where p t = probability of obtaining a better job, p t is contained in the interval [0,1] t = time = total time on welfare t w = state-specific time limit for receiving welfare t max I 1 = income received from first job, job J 1 I 2 = income received from second job, job J 2 S = public assistance subsidy
The basic decision facing the worker is: At what time is it optimal to quit her current job? A simple search model can highlight some important potential determinants of this decision. 15 The assumptions of the model are:
• A worker maximizes the expected value of utility, discounted to the present, over an infinite horizon.
• The quality of a job is summarized by the wage rate.
• Income while employed is constant (either I 1 or I 2 ).
• S is constant as long as t . w < t max • Value function, V( p t ), is constant through time.
• The possible outcome of a lower-paying job is not allowed for. (Presumably returning to welfare is preferable to a job paying less than I 1 or the person would not have quit.) Thus, the problem is (for t ):
The model that follows is the standard job search framework applied to the decision to quit one's job. Blau (1991) is a good reference for another application of this model. 16 The assumption will be that t < t max since individuals who have received welfare continuously since the reform was enacted will reach their lifetime limit in January 2001 (a date which is later than the last separation date in the data set).
where
, and q t = 1 if the worker quits 0 if worker doesn' t quit
and p t , I 1 , I 2 , and S are defined above. ε t is the disturbance term with a probability distribution, P(ε t p t ,q t ), defined as:
The transition equation is:
The probability of finding a better job is equal to p with probability one if q t = 1, and it is a random draw from the distribution function F(.) if q t = 0 .
The equation to be maximized is (see Bellman 1957) :
which can be written as choosing the maximum between two options, to quit or not to quit one's current job:
This equation can also be written as:
where:
If
which can be illustrated graphically as a function of p t (the probability of getting a better job):
Thus, the optimal quitting rule is given by:
We also know:
since utility is increasing in both income and leisure and
Thus, when the value of quitting exceeds the value of not quitting ( p t ≥ p t * ), the individual should quit her job. Similarly, if the value of not quitting exceeds the value of quitting ( p t < p t * ), she should not quit her current job. An individual's probability of obtaining a better job, p, relative to the probability that makes the value of not quitting equal to the value of quitting, p*, is one of the key factors in determining whether to quit or not to quit. The values of -10 -S, I 1 , and I 2 also will be key determinants in this decision.
To derive the impact changes in S, I 1 , I 2 , or β have on p*, equation (11) can be written as:
and
Integrating over p, simplifying, and solving for p*, we have:
Assuming that p ~ uniform(0,1) implies that F(p*) = p* so that
. Therefore, an implicit function for p* can be defined as:
which can be simplified to:
Appealing to the implicit function rule, the following partial derivatives are obtained:
17 Details can be found in Appendix A. 18 Details can be found in Appendix A.
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A higher discount rate( β ) applied to future earnings implies one will be more likely to quit because the (probability) point at which the value of quitting equals the value of not quitting has decreased. Individuals who previously did not quit because p t < p* , now may find p t > p* as they seek to "cash in" on the immediately higher income from job J 2 (again, since both I 1 and I 2 are now more heavily discounted in the future).
A higher income in one's current job ( I 1 ) will increase the reservation probability because now the current job is relatively more attractive. Holding all other variables constant, the probability level at which the value of quitting and not quitting is equal is now higher.
Individuals now should be less likely to quit.
Higher earnings in the better job (if one quits) ( I 2 ) leads to a decrease in the reservation probability. Thus, the difference between p and p* will decrease: individuals will be more likely to quit as expected earnings from obtaining a better job increase.
A higher subsidy (S) will increase the reservation probability. A higher subsidy increases the y-intercept of the graph of V( p t ) and also makes the slope flatter. Thus, if p t equals zero (or is relatively small) and an individual quits, she can expect to earn S; however, if p t is relatively high, expected earnings in the future (taking into account there is probability p t of obtaining the better job and probability (1-p t ) of receiving the subsidy) do not increase as quickly (due to the flatter slope). At p*, she is indifferent between being at the current job and trying her luck by quitting (in which case she gets S or I 2 ). Since S has gone up, to have the expected value of
-12 -what an individual gets when she quits equal to the same constant number ( I 1 and its discounted income in the future), p* must go up so that (1-p*) goes down. I 2 now receives a greater probability weight and S receives a lower probability weight.)
This operationalization of quit behavior indicates that welfare subsidies and earnings on the job will be important determinants of observed job separations. Firm-specific human capital theory suggest that job tenure will also be important in determining job separations. The longer an employee remains at her present place of employment, the more specific human capital she is likely to acquire, which increases productivity on the current job. Since her present employer is compensating her for her increased (specific) human capital, and other potential employers will not, it is in her interest to not quit her current job.
The job-matching theory also predicts that tenure on the job will be related to separation behavior, but for different reasons (Jovanovic 1979a,b) . Initially, when the worker begins the job, neither the firm nor the worker knows the quality of the job match. Hence, the probability of quitting in the initial stages of employment is low. As time on the job increases and the worker collects more information about the job match, such as information on working conditions, the worker evaluates her job match. 19 Poor matches are resolved by the worker quitting, while good matches result in the worker staying. Thus, this theory predicts that the hazard of a job ending will initially be quite low, then increase as jobs deemed to be bad matches end, followed by a decrease in the hazard as the matches that continue are primarily good ones.
20
While the amount of specific human capital is not expected to differ across welfare and 19 Job match theory predicts good matches will receive higher wages and poor matches lower wages. However, information about job match quality cannot come through wages as this job is covered by a union contract. 20 For studies that examine the role matching has in the tenure-turnover relationship, see Lane and Parkin (1998) and Chapman and Southwick (1991) .
-13 -non-welfare hires (since jobs held by both in this analysis are entry-level jobs), differential jobmatching may provide some explanation if separation behavior differs across welfare status.
Welfare hires may have inferior job matches compared to non-welfare hires due to their (possibly) limited past employment experiences and the pressure to obtain a job quickly in order to comply with the new welfare requirements. On the other hand, welfare hires may have better job matches (or bad matches but not act on them by ending the job) compared to non-welfare hires as they may face limited alternative job offers due to, perhaps, less experience and education.
21
The simple quit model, the theory of firm-specific human capital, and the job-matching theory suggest that a worker's wage, the size of the alternative welfare subsidy, and the length of time with the employer will be important determinants of job separations.
IV. Empirical Analysis
While much attention has been focused on the ability of welfare recipients to find a job, little attention has been given to their turnover behavior. The empirical analysis here is designed to answer three questions: (1) Is the separation behavior of former welfare recipients, in fact, different from other similar workers? If so, how and why does it differ? (2) What types of a work program contributes to higher retention rates? (3) Does the time to separation vary by welfare status for different reasons for separating?
A. Time to Job Separation: A Survival Analysis
To explicitly address the issue of job duration or tenure, a survival model is estimated 21 This is an application of the theory of matching with job search developed by Jovanovic (1979a).
-14 -using the entire sample and also estimated separately by welfare status. 22 As presented in Cox and Oakes (1984) and Collett (1994) , a proportional hazards model is commonly thought of as being comprised of two pieces, a baseline hazard in which all explanatory variables are zero,
, and a function that takes on the values of the vector of explanatory variables, Ω h 0 (t) (X i ,β):
where Ω(X i ,β) is typically specified as exp(β 1i X 1i + β 2i X 2i + ...+ β ki X ki ) .
23
Assuming that the hazard h(t i , X) is continuous and constant over each interval [ , and that a specific regression model with a known distribution up to a vector parameter θ has been specified, the likelihood function can be considered to be made up of two pieces, depending on whether the observation is censored or not:
where τ i = 1 if the observation is not censored (i.e., separates at time t or before) and τ i = 0 if the observation is censored (i.e., stays beyond time t), f (t i X i ,θ) is the probability density function of the random search duration, T, and F(t i X i ,θ) is the cumulative distribution function of T.
Following Kiefer (1988) , the proportional hazard model (equation 21) can be translated into a linear accelerated failure time (AFT) model:
22 For other examples of the use of hazard functions to explore quit behavior, see Light and Ureta (1992) , Meitzen (1986), and Sicherman (1996) . 23 See Cox and Oakes (1984) , page 70. The use of the exponential function imposes no restrictions on β due to the function's non-negativity. 24 See Burdett and Cunningham (1998) , Kiefer (1988 ), and Stata Corporation (1999 . The assumption is that censoring times are independent or fixed. If no observations were censored, the likelihood function would simply be the joint probability distribution of the sample as a function of θ.
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log-normal model (K=0), Weibull model (K=1), and exponential model (K=1 and s=1).
The coefficients estimated for the full sample and by welfare status are reported in Table   4 . 26 The first point of interest is that being a welfare hire reduces turnover (see column 1).
Being a welfare hire increases median tenure by about seven days. A higher wage rate and being a student also have the effect of increasing median tenure, by 61 days and 25 days, respectively. 27 A higher state benefit also increases median tenure, but by a very small amount (a $10 increase in the state benefit increases median tenure by about one day). The positive impacts of the wage and sate benefit are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model of quit behavior presented in the previous section. All racial marginal effects are significant at 25 The model was estimated assuming a log-normal, log-logistic, weibull, and exponential distributions. The generalized gamma was selected as the preferred model based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The AIC for the gamma model is -243,904; -247,696 for the lognormal; -248,424 for the log-logistic; -256,787 for the Weibull; -271,624 for the exponential. The conclusions did not change when different distributional assumptions were made. 26 Note that a positive coefficient implies predicted tenure is extended. 27 This positive impact of a higher wage on retention is consistent with other studies. For example, see Berg et al. 1990 , Leete 1996 , and Lane and Stevens 1995.
-16 -the 90% level. Being a Hispanic increases median tenure by 8 days, while being Asian reduces median tenure by 25 days, being Native American reduces it by 10 days, and being white reduces it by five days (relative to blacks). Females, older workers, and better-educated workers have the effect of reducing median tenure, as do individuals working the day shift. Working the sunrise shift increases median tenure by 6 days.
[ Table 4 here]
Based on the estimated coefficients, and using the average characteristics by welfare status, the predicted tenure of welfare hires is 128 days, and for non-welfare hires it is 114 days.
Thus, the average welfare hire stays 14 days longer than the average non-welfare hire.
Looking at the estimated marginal effects for welfare and non-welfare hires, a number of results stand out. Welfare hires appear to be more sensitive to changes in the wage rate. 28 This result suggests that firms have a powerful tool to lower quits among welfare hires (raise the wage). If the wage is too low, welfare hires may see returning to welfare as a viable alternative, whereas non-welfare hires may not consider it. In other words, there are a greater number of viable substitutes to this job for welfare hires, particularly, going back to welfare.
In addition, for a welfare hire to have an education beyond high school, there is no significant impact on the predicted time until separating, while for non-welfare hires it speeds up the time until separating. The magnitude of several of the marginal effects is larger for welfare hires; in terms of the student variable, it possibly indicates that welfare hires place more value on the ability to be able to combine school and work, in the hopes that it will provide them with a better (economic) future. While not statistically significantly different from zero, the impact of previous experience with this employer on time until separation is of interest. Its impact on 28 The magnitude of the coefficient and marginal effect, however, should make us wary about predicting effects out of sample.
-17 -lengthening time until separation for non-welfare hires and speeding up time until separation for welfare hires suggests that non-welfare hires may be better able to take advantage of job match quality information gleaned from the earlier relationship. Non-welfare hires also appear to be more sensitive than welfare hires to the shift of work and to the unemployment rate.
B. The Influence of Work Programs on Separation Behavior
The firm being studied operates over 30 work programs throughout the United States, mainly in major cities. 29 The availability of these programs is not restricted to welfare hires, nor are they offered in all locations that hire welfare recipients. The main program category types are: mentoring programs, in which a more senior employee serves as a guide for the new hire (Mentor); school programs, in which high school or college classes are offered on-site, or at a reduced cost (School); work-related skills programs, in which basic job skill classes are available from local agencies (Work); and transportation programs, which provide the employee with reduced or free transportation to work (Transp).
To examine the impact particular program type availabilities have on the separation behavior of workers, equation (23) 29 Approximately 28% of the workers in this study have a work program available to them.
-18 -the program effects (and for brevity), equation (24) is estimated on the full sample only with the inclusion of interaction terms between welfare and the work program dummy variables to see if the programs have a differential impact by welfare status. Table 5 presents the coefficients (and marginal effects) from estimating equation (24).
Availability of mentoring programs do increase median tenure by 27 days, while all other program types reduce median tenure (work and school programs) or have no significant effect (transportation programs). This provides a strong incentive for firms to actively match welfare hires with a mentor to improve stability. Interacting Welfare with the work program dummy variables indicates that these programs do not have a differential impact across welfare status.
[ Table 5 here]
C. Types of Separation: A Competing RisksAnalysis
An individual may separate from his or her employer for a variety of reasons. In addition, separating due to absenteeism is most likely a very different way to end a spell of employment than is separating due to obtaining a different job. A competing risks model is estimated to determine whether welfare hires separate from their jobs for systematically different reasons than non-welfare hires.
Grouping the reasons reported for no longer being employed, there are three distinct processes, identified by the index r: 30 The subscript NW refers to non-welfare hires and W refers to welfare hires.
-19 -Taking into account covariates and following Cox and Oakes (1984) , the log likelihood function for the independent competing risks model is:
where S r is the survivor function for the rth reason for separating estimated in AFT metric (vs.
the log-relative hazard metric of proportional hazard models); h r is the hazard function for the rth reason for separating estimated in AFT metric; t i represents observed tenure for the ith employee;
d ri is an indicator variable equal to one if individual i separates for reason r, 0 otherwise; and γ i represents all of the explanatory variables included in equation (23). Assuming independence amounts to assuming that unobservables that contribute to each type of separation are uncorrelated.
32
The results of the competing risks model are presented separately for welfare and nonwelfare hires in Table 6 . Being a welfare hire has a significant effect on time until separation for any reason (see notes to Table 6 ). In particular, tenure is increased if the welfare hire separates for personal reasons. That is, welfare hires tend to delay their time until separation for personal reasons. In addition, welfare hires delay their time until separation for professional reasons and speed up their time until separation for being fired for cause. The view that welfare recipients have many personal issues (child care, etc.) that interfere with their work is not substantiated by these results. However, the result that welfare hires separate faster for being fired for cause 31 Where an individual is labeled as failing if r=r i , otherwise the individual is censored. See Cox and Oakes (1984) . 32 Söderberg and Lyhagen (1999) propose an information matrix test for dependence between risks. However, since only tenure i =min(tenure ri ) and d i are observed, one cannot test the assumption of independence between tenure 1 , tenure 2 , and tenure 3 (see Lawless 1982, 483) . The assumption of independence is commonly used in research; see Blank (1989) , Blank and Ruggles (1994) , and Addison and Portugal (1999) . For papers using a dependent competing risks framework, see Dolton and van der Klaauw (1999) and van Ophem and Jonker (1997).
-20 -suggests that firms may want to monitor the work behavior of welfare hires, such as their attendance. These results are consistent with the job separation study of welfare hires by Berg et al. (1992) . It also suggests that it may take a welfare hire longer to find alternative job prospects.
[ Table 6 here]
Examining the impact the wage rate has on the predicted time until separation, welfare hires are again found to be more sensitive to changes in the wage rate. In terms of the reason for separating, welfare hires who separate due to professional reasons are most sensitive to a change in the wage rate, while for non-welfare hires, individuals who separate due to being fired for cause are most sensitive to a change in the wage rate.
The greater than high school dummy variable is significant for non-welfare hires, but not for welfare hires. Having greater than a high school education accelerates the time until separation for professional reasons and decelerates the time until separation for being fired for cause (for non-welfare hires). Thus, non-welfare hires who have a high school education or beyond will be more likely to separate sooner, either because they found a different job or because they were dissatisfied with the job match.
Being a student delays the predicted time until separation for both welfare and nonwelfare hires, for all separation reasons. Being a student has the largest impact on delaying the time until separation for professional reasons, for both welfare and non-welfare hires. This result is expected since most students have fewer (better) job opportunities available to them, compared to individuals who have completed their education.
Calculating the predicted tenure for welfare hires and non-welfare hires (evaluated at sample averages), by reason for separating, indicates that the average welfare hire is predicted to stay on the job for 50 days if the reason for separation is professional. The average non-welfare -21 -hire is estimated to stay on the job for 34 days if the reason for separating is professional.
Looking at personal reasons for separating, the average non-welfare hire's predicted tenure is found to be 84 days; for welfare hires it is 97 days. The predicted tenure for being fired for cause for a welfare hire is 703 days, and for an average non-welfare hire it is 1,293 days. 33 Thus, an average welfare hire's tenure is predicted to be longer than an average non-welfare hire's tenure if the reason for separating is professional or personal, and shorter if the reason for is due to being fired for cause.
V. Summary and Conclusions
This paper looks beyond the probability of welfare recipients finding employment; it focuses on the post-hiring behavior of the welfare recipient and how it compares to the behavior of the non-welfare hire. The results both confirm some earlier findings and provide new insight as to the stability of welfare hires. In particular, a survival analysis finds that welfare hires stay on the job longer than non-welfare hires. At the median tenure, the difference in time until separation may seem relatively small (7 days), but it nevertheless may dispels the idea that welfare hires are unstable workers.
Additionally, welfare hire separations were found to be more sensitive to the wage rate than non-welfare hire separations. If the goal is to increase the retention of welfare hires, increasing the wage rate would be an effective tool; states might consider supplementing the wages of welfare hires directly instead of providing tax credits to the firms hiring them. It also appears as though welfare hire separations are not as sensitive to the shift work as non-welfare hire separations, suggesting firms need not be concerned to which shift they assign welfare hires. 33 The predicted values for the tenure of being fired for cause should be read with caution. The log likelihood value for this model was much lower than for the other reasons for quitting.
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The presence of mentoring programs seems to be of particular importance for lengthening all worker's time to separation. Work and school programs may not directly work in the firm's interest by reducing turnover; however, they could be increasing the general human capital of these employees. The various types of work programs do not have a differential effect on welfare hires, suggesting that these programs are not targeted exclusively to meet the needs of welfare hires, or that welfare hires benefit from the programs by as much as non-welfare hires.
Lastly, the results from a competing risks analysis indicate that welfare hires are not separating for personal reasons at an accelerated rate, compared to non-welfare hires. However, they are separating at an accelerated rate for being fired for cause, and at a slower rate for professional reasons. So, while it may be important to provide for the child care and other personal concerns of welfare recipients to get them into a job, once these issues have been addressed (and the welfare hire is in a job), personal matters do not impact on a welfare hire's separation decision any more than that of a non-welfare hire.
While the results from this study of separation behavior of welfare hires at one firm may or may not be applicable to the population as a whole, this analysis has been able to provide important new insight on a number of questions: (1) welfare hires are not any less stable (and in fact stay slightly longer on the job) than non-welfare hires; (2) the wage level turns out to be the most important factor in determining the time before separation, and is even a stronger determinant for welfare hires than for non-welfare hires; (3) mentoring programs are the best use of resources in lengthening time to separation; and (4) welfare hires do not separate faster for personal reasons, but they do separate faster for being fired for cause, and separate slower for professional reasons.
-23 - Marginal effects are in brackets; they are evaluated at the median tenure. Standard errors for the marginal effects are available from the authors, but indicated levels of significance match those of the parameter coefficients. *** indicates significant at the 99% level; ** indicates significant at the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level. 
